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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code
Annotated section 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1992) which grants jurisdiction
over cases transferred to this Court from the Utah Supreme Court.
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
I.

Did the District Court properly grant Judgment on

the Pleadings in favor of plaintiff, Mountain America Credit
Union ("Mountain America"), when it was clear and unambiguous,
based on the pleadings alone, that defendant McClellan was
personally liable on the promissory note?

This is a question of

law reviewed for correctness. Wineaar v. Froerer Corp.. 813 P.2d
104, 107 (Utah 1991).
II.

Did the District Court properly deny McClellan7s

Motion to Set Aside Judgment which was brought over eight months
after the judgment was entered and was supported only by
inadmissible hearsay evidence?

The reviewing court should

examine this issue under an abuse of discretion standard because
denial of a motion to set aside judgment on the pleadings is
analogous to denial of a motion to set aside a default judgment.
The denial of a motion to set aside a default judgment is
reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.

Russell v.

Martell. 681 P.2d 1193, 1194 (Utah 1984); Gardiner and Gardiner
Builders v. Swapp, 656 P.2d 429, 430 (Utah 1982).
III. Did the District Court properly deny McClellan7s
second Motion to Set Aside Judgment which was based upon Mountain
America's alleged failure to comply with the "one action" rule?
1

This is also an abuse of discretion standard of review because,
as described above*, a motion to set aside judgment on the
pleadings is so closely analogous to a motion to set aside a
default judgment.

Russell, 681 P.2d at 1194; Gardiner, 656 P.2d

at 430.
IV.

Did the District Court properly deny McClellan's

Motion for Leave to File a Third-Party Complaint and to Assert a
Cross-claim?

This is an abuse of discretion standard.

Girard v.

Appleby, 600 P.2d 245, 248 (Utah 1983).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
STATUTES:
1.

Utah Code Annotated section 57-4a-2 (1990) reads in

relevant part: "A recorded document imparts notice of its
contents regardless of any defect, irregularity, or omission in
its execution, attestation, or acknowledgment."
2.

Utah Code Annotated section 70A-3-403 (1992) reads

in relevant part: "An authorized representative who signs his own
name to an instrument . . . is personally obligated if the
instrument names the person represented but does not show that
the representative signed in a representative capacity . . . ."
3.

Utah Code Annotated section 78-37-1 (1992) reads in

relevant part: "There can be one action for the recovery of any
debt or the enforcement of any right secured solely by mortgage
upon real estate which action must be in accordance with the
provisions of this chapter."

2

RULES:
1.

Rule 8(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure sets

forth in relevant part: "In a pleading to a preceding pleading, a
party shall set forth affirmatively accord and satisfaction . . .
estoppel . . . and any other matter constituting an avoidance or
affirmative defense."
2.

Rule 12(h) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

provides in pertinent part: "A party waives all defenses and
objections which he does not present . . . in his answer or reply
tt

. . . .

3.

Rule 13(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

provides in relevant part:

a party may plead a "cross-claim . .

. against a co-party arising out of the transaction or occurrence
that is the subject matter of the original transaction. . . . "
4.

Rule 15(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

provides, in relevant part, that once a responsive pleading has
been filed, "a party may amend his [or her] pleading only by
leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and
leave shall be freely given when justice so requires."
5.

Rule 56(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

provides:
Should it appear from the affidavits of a
party opposing the motion that he cannot for
reasons stated present by affidavit facts
essential to justify his opposition, the
court may refuse the application for judgment
or may order a continuance to permit
affidavits to be obtained or depositions to
be taken or discovery to be had or may make
such other order as is just.
3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature and Course of Proceedings:

This appeal

involves defendant McClellan's personal liability on a promissory
note signed by him on June 5, 1984.
4.)

(Addendum Exhibit "A"; R. at

The trial court granted judgment on the pleadings in favor

of plaintiff Mountain America and against defendant McClellan on
January 23, 1990.

(R. at 41.) This is an appeal taken from the

following rulings of the Fifth District Court: (1) an Order
granting judgment on the pleadings in favor of Mountain America
entered on January 23, 1990; (2) an Order denying McClellan7s
Motion to Set Aside Judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b) entered on
October 16, 1990; (3) an Order denying McClellan's Motion to
Reconsider and Set Aside Judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b) entered
on January 30, 1992; and (4) an Order denying McClelland Motion
for Leave to file a Third Party Complaint and to Assert a CrossClaim entered on December 27, 1991.
B.

Statement of Facts Relevant to Issues Presented:

This appeal arises from the default on a loan made to Calistoga
Corporation ("Calistoga") as a corporation and Robert E.
McClellan ("McClellan") and Randy Hoyt ("Hoyt") as individuals.
(R. at 2.)

Mountain America became the successor in interest to

Horizon Thrift after the latter went into receivership.
2.)

(R. at

The loan was made on or about June 5, 1984, and total

payment was due thereunder on September 10, 1984.
McClellan and Hoyt evidenced the loan by signing a
4

(R. at 4.)

promissory note ("Note") twice under the space provided for
"Maker's/Debtor's Signature(s)" —

signing once on the lower left

by indicating their representative capacity as officers of
Calistoga; signing a second time on the lower right as
individuals by not limiting their signature with any corporate
qualification.

(R. at 4.)

Mountain America brought an action against McClellan
and Hoyt as co-defendants for the then outstanding debt of
$40,192.63.
prejudice.

(R. at 2.) Hoyt was later dismissed without
(R. at 176.) McClellan answered the Complaint on

September 12, 1989, admitting that he signed the Note, and
failing to make any defense of fact as to why his individual
signature appeared thereon.

(R. at 9-11.)

On November 6, 1989, Mountain America filed a Motion
for Judgment on the Pleadings.

(R. at 15.) Having reviewed the

relevant pleadings and the relevant motion, objection, and
response to judgment thereon, the District Court entered an Order
granting judgment in favor of Mountain America on January 23,
1990.

(R. at 41-42.)
Mountain America served on McClellan a Request for

Admission, in which McClellan admitted personal liability on the
Note.

The Request and Response read as follows:
Request No. l: Admit that on or about
the 5th day of June, 1984, you executed and
delivered to Plaintiff a Promissory Note and
Disclosure in the amount of $30,420.00 as
secretary of the corporation Callistoga Court
Club, Inc. and personally, a true and correct
copy of which is attached hereto.
5

Response No, 1:
(R. at 22.)

Admitted.

Although the theory of McClellan's personal

liability formed the basis of Mountain America's Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings (Trans. Hearing October 2, 1990 at 10),
there is no evidence in the record that Mountain America or the
District Court relied on the above admission in seeking or
granting the Motion.

(R. at 15-20, 30-36, 41-42.)

On September 24, 1990, eight months after judgment had
been entered against him, McClellan filed a Motion to Set Aside
Judgment based on inadmissible hearsay evidence.
83, 232; Trans. Hearing October 2, 1990 at 12-13.)

(R. at 74, 81At a hearing

on the motion, the District Court found "no other factual basis
—

or no other basis in the record for any other explanation of

why they [McClellan and Hoyt] signed the note, other than they
were agreeing to be responsible for it."
Hearing October 2, 1990 at 13.)

(R. at 232; Trans.

Thus, on October 16, 1990, the

District Court entered an Order denying McClellan's Motion to Set
Aside Judgment.

(R. at 88-89.)

McClellan's counsel discovered for the first time in
November 1991, over two years after Mountain America's Complaint
had been filed, that the loan to his client had been secured by
real property.

(R. at 142-43.)

Based on an alleged violation of

the "one-action" rule, McClellan filed a Motion to Reconsider and
Set Aside Judgment on November 13, 1991.

(R. at 136-37.)

Mountain America objected to McClellan's motion on the grounds
that a prior lienholder had foreclosed out Mountain America's
6

interest in the security before Mountain America had filed their
Complaint.

(R. at 158-59.)

On January 30, 1992, the District

Court denied McClellan7s Motion to Reconsider.

(R. at 220.)

On October 28, 1991, McClellan filed a Motion for Leave
to File a Third-Party Complaint and to Assert a Cross-claim.
at 111.)

(R.

After oral argument on the motion, the District Court

entered an Order dismissing Hoyt without prejudice and denying
McClellan7s motions to file a third-party complaint and assert a
cross-claim.

(R. at 191.)

The court stated: "Defendant,

McClellan, should have and could have raised the issues he now
seeks to raise prior to judgment, rather than now nearly two
years after judgment."

(R. at 192.)

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The District Court properly granted Mountain America7s
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings for two reasons. First,
McClellan7s Answer did not deny the debt, nor is it a sufficient
basis to ignore a document that is clear and unambiguous on its
face.

Second, the law is well settled that where the signer7s

name appears unambiguously, extraneous evidence showing intent
with which the instrument was signed is inadmissible.
The District Court properly denied McClellan7s
September 24, 1990 Motion to Set Aside Judgment.

A reviewing

court should examine whether a Motion to Set Aside Judgment is
correctly denied based on an abuse of discretion standard.

The

District Court did not abuse its discretion when it denied
McClellan7s Motion to Set Aside Judgment.
7

First, there is no

evidence in the record that the District Court considered matters
outside the pleadings.

Second, McClellan attempted to set aside

the judgment based on inadmissible hearsay evidence contained in
Shumate's (McClellan's counsel) affidavit.

McClellan had over

eight months to discover admissible evidence to establish his
defense.

Third, Shumate's affidavit could not have been treated

as a Rule 56(f) affidavit since it was submitted in support of a
Motion to Set Aside Judgment on the Pleadings, not in opposition
to summary judgment as is required under Rule 5(5 (f).
The District Court did not abuse its discretion when it
denied McClellan7s November 13, 1991 Motion to Reconsider and Set
Aside Judgment.

First, McClellan waived the right to raise the

one-action rule as an affirmative defense when he failed to raise
it in his responsive pleading, over two years eeirlier.
Attempting to raise the defense more than two ye»ars after filing
his Answer is grossly untimely and violates the fundamental
principle of judicial economy.

Second, even if McClellan had

properly raised the one-action rule as an affirmative defense,
Mountain America never violated the rule because a senior
lienholder foreclosed on the property before Mountain America
brought the instant action against McClellan.

A typographical

error in the legal description of the real property collateral
did not place Mountain America in the position of senior
lienholder.

Furthermore, based on Utah law, Mountain America was

under no obligation to allege and prove that a senior lienholder
had previously foreclosed on the real property collateral.
8

Third, even if properly raised as an affirmative defense, and
even if Mountain America does not qualify for the junior
lienholder exception, at most the one-action rule would operate
as a waiver of Mountain America7s right to foreclose on the real
property collateral. McClellan would still be personally liable
on the Note.
McClellan's Motion for Leave to Amend his Answer was
properly denied by the District Court.

The court's ruling did

not constitute an abuse of discretion.

First, McClellan's Motion

for Leave came unreasonably late in the proceeding —
years after McClellan filed his Answer.

over two

Second, the substance of

McClellan's "new" allegations were known more than two years
prior to bringing the motion.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY GRANTED
JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS IN FAVOR OF
PLAINTIFF, MOUNTAIN AMERICA, WHEN IT WAS
CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS, BASED ON THE
PLEADINGS ALONE, THAT DEFENDANT
MCCLELLAN WAS PERSONALLY LIABLE ON THE
PROMISSORY NOTE.

Defendant McClellan's personal liability on the
promissory note ("Note") which is the subject of this suit is
clear and unambiguous.

McClellan's liability in his individual

capacity is evident from the pleadings alone.

The Note was

incorporated as part of the original complaint and unquestionably
demonstrates McClellan's liability based on having affixed his
signature thereto as an individual, without any reference to a
corporation or any representative capacity.
9

(Addendum Exhibit

"A"; R. at 4.)

In fact, McClellan has never disputed whether the

signature was his, nor has he disputed the manner in which he
signed.

Because the Note was clear and unambiguous, the District

Court properly granted judgment in favor of Mountain America and
against McClellan.
A.

McClellan's mere allegation that the
Note was signed in his representative
capacity did not deny the debt and is
not a sufficient basis to ignore a
document that is clear and iiwamiviquQiig
on its face.

In response to Mountain American's allegation that
"Defendants executed and delivered to Plaintiff a Promissory Note
or Installment Loan Agreement" (Complaint 5 2; R. at 2 ) ,
McClellan responded by simply alleging: "The Defendant admits
that he executed the Promissory note or Installment Loan
Agreement, but affirmatively asserts that his execution of that
agreement was in his capacity as the secretary of the Calistoga
Court Club, Inc." (Answer 5 2, R. at 10.)
Mountain America concedes that McClellan signed the
Note in his representative capacity as Secretary of the Calistoga
Court Club, Inc.

However, the Note conclusively establishes that

McClellan also signed the Note in his personal capacity.

In the

space provided for the "Makers/Debtor's Signature(s)," McClellan
signed twice.

(Addendum Exhibit "A"; R. at 4.)

McClellan signed

once on the lower left hand side of the Note, referencing his
representative capacity as Secretary, by writing in "sec" after
his name.

McClellan signed a second time on the lower right hand
10

side without adding any qualification.
at 4.)

(Addendum Exhibit "A"; R.

To argue that McClellan signed the same Note twice in his

representative capacity makes no sense.
same Note twice for the same corporation?

Why would one sign the
Furthermore, why would

one sign the Note in two distinctly different ways, allegedly
fulfilling the same function?
In addition to the logical inconsistency of McClellan's
argument, to merely allege that McClellan signed the Note in his
representative capacity does not deny Mountain America's claim,
nor does it controvert evidence that is clear and unambiguous on
its face.

The commonly accepted rule of law has been summarized

as follows:
Every person whose name appears on a bill or
note is prima facie liable in the capacity
indicated by the position, whether as maker,
drawer, acceptor, or indorser, in which his
name appears, unless there is some
qualification, limitation or extension of his
liability annexed thereto. . . . Where the
signature is in the usual place for the
signature of the maker or drawer, there is a
presumption that the signature is in that
capacity.
12 Am. Jur. 2d Bills and Notes § 1172 (1964).
Because McClellan signed the Note without
qualification, and because he signed the Note in the space
provided for the "maker/debtor,,f he is presumptively personally
liable on the Note.

Merely alleging McClellan signed the Note in

his representative capacity is not sufficient to deny a debt that
is clear and unambiguous.

Such an allegation is reminiscent of a

wise farmer who was once heard to say: "Just because you call a
11

pig a cow, it don't mean you can milk it."

In sum, the trial

court properly ruled that on the face of the pleadings, a defense
to personal liability had not been established.
B•

Utah law, as well as that of other
jurisdictions, clearly establishes that
where the signer's name appears
unambiguously, there should be no
admission of extraneous evidence to show
the intent with which an agent signed
the instrument.

The District Court's judgment on the pleadings in favor
of Mountain America should be upheld on review.

Because the Note

is unambiguous on its face, the court would not have been able to
examine extrinsic evidence.

It is a longstanding principle of

negotiable instruments law that the issue of whether an
authorized representative will be held personally liable on a
note is whether his signature is ambiguous.

John S. Herbrand,

Annotation, Construction and Application of UCC S 3-403(2)
Dealing With Personal Liability of Authorized Representative Who
Signs Negotiable Instrument in His Own Name, 97 A.L.R.3d 798, 802
(1980).

The District Court ruling should be affirmed because it

is clear and unambiguous that McClellan signed the Note so as to
incur individual liability.
As early as 1919, the Utah Supreme Court held:
The law is well settled that where an agent
has signed a contract in a personal capacity
— this is, executed it in a manner clearly
indicating that the liability is his alone —
extrinsic proof is not admissible to
discharge him from liability upon it. If he
personally is, in unambiguous terms, bound to
fulfill, he must fulfill.
12

Roe v, Schweitzer. 55 Utah 204, 212, 184 P. 938, 941 (Utah 1919).
Roe involved an action to recover from an officer of a gold
mining company $200 paid to him for stock, for which he receipted
individually and without designation as such officer.
205-10.

Id. at

The Court held that extrinsic proof that he acted in an

official capacity was not admissible to discharge him from
liability.

Id. at 212.

This "well settled" evidentiary principle in Roe was
subsequently adopted in Starley v. Deseret Foods Corp., 93 Utah
577, 74 P.2d 1221 (Utah 1938).

The appellant in Starlev

contended that he was liable in his representative capacity as
secretary of Deseret Foods, even though he had signed the $2,500
promissory note as simply "Grant Morgan."

The Supreme Court,

found that there was no ambiguity in the manner the note was
signed.

Id. at 581-82, 74 P.2d at 1223.

In fact, the Court

stated "[t]here would be no uncertainty or ambiguity unless parol
evidence is first introduced to cause such uncertainty."

Id.

In

conclusion the Starley court stated:
Courts have been quite ready to open the case
to parol evidence to explain the intention of
the maker where there is anything on the face
of the note giving rise to ambiguity. . . .
But where there is no ambiguity, the rule
will not be relaxed. The intention of the
parties must be gathered from the instrument
itself. Any other rule would tend to destroy
the value of written instruments.
Id. at 584, 74 P.2d at 1224.
Utah Code Annotated Section 70A-3-403 (1992), Utah's
adoption of Uniform Commercial Code Section 3-403, sets forth in
13

relevant part:

"An authorized representative who signs his own

name to an instrument . . . is personally obligeited if the
instrument names the person represented but does not show that
the representative signed in a representative capacity . . . ."
This statute embodies many of the principles pertaining to the
admissibility of extrinsic evidence, and the personal liability
of individuals purportedly signing in their representative
capacities.
For example, the more recent case of Bushnell Real
Estate, Inc. v. Nielson, 672 P.2d 746, 748 (Utah 1983)(opinion by
Durham, J.), involved a suit to collect on a promissory note.
The note had been signed by each of the defendants in his
capacity as an individual.

Id.

The Supreme Court concluded

that "there are no facts alleged by defendants from which the
court could conclude that the note upon which plaintiff brings
suit is unclear, ambiguous . . . ."

Id. at 752.

The Utah Supreme Court has overturned trial courts that
have allowed extrinsic evidence to come in to show the motivation
of a signer of a promissory note, that otherwise clearly and
unambiguously establishes the personal liability of the maker.
See, e.g.,
(Utah 1981).

Utah Valley Bank v. Tanner, 636 P.2d 1060, 1061-62
In Tanner, the Court held that admission of

evidence that the bank's agent Robert Chatfield assured the
signer that only a co-signer had liability on the note was
reversible error.

Id.

Viewed "objectively and reasonably," the

Court concluded, the note itself "reflects that McGraw [the
14

debtor] signed in his individual capacity as a co-maker of the
note."

Id^_ at 1062.
As capably set forth in Tanner.
[t]he basic rule of contract
interpretation is that the intent of the
parties is to be ascertained from the content
of the instrument itself, the rationale for
the rule being to preserve the sanctity of
written instruments. . . . It is only when
an ambiguity exists which cannot be
reconciled by an objective and reasonable
interpretation of the contract as a whole
that resort may be had to the use of
extrinsic evidence.

Id.
The majority of jurisdictions follow Utah,s approach.
For example, Barden & Robeson Corp. v. Ferrusi, 384 N.Y.S.2d 596
(N.Y. App. Div. 1976), involved a case where the execution of a
promissory note by the individuals was admitted, and there was no
showing that the individuals signed in a representative capacity.
The court held that under U.C.C. section 3-403(2)(a) there was no
triable issue of fact and the individuals were personally liable
on the note as a matter of law despite the fact that the
individuals, in opposition to a motion for summary judgment by
the payee, contended that the promissory note was forwarded to
the payee with an accompanying letter which stated that the
individuals signed the note as officers of the alleged corporate
principal. Id. at 597-98.

See also Bank v. Cannon. 414 So. 2d

926 (Ala. 1982); Gainok v. Featherson. 641 P.2d 909 (Ariz. App.
1982); Starlev v. Deseret Foods Corp.. 74 P.2d 1221, 1224 (Utah
1938)(listing early cases in other jurisdictions that follow
15

Utah).
That McClellan signed the Note twice is prima facie
evidence in and of itself that the parties intended McClellan to
be personally liable under the Note.

The universal practice in

the commercial world is that where individual liability is
demanded, "the corporate officer signs twice, once as an officer
and again as an individual."

18B Am. Jur. 2d Corporations § 1838

(1985) ; see also East Tincup. Inc. v. Asphalt Pcivincr Co.. 470
P.2d 58 (Colo. App. 1970) (officers signed once cis officers and a
second time as individuals); Salzman Sign Co. v. Beck. 176 N.E.2d
74 (N.Y. 1961).

"The signature of an individual on the face of a

note, at the bottom on the right, without limiting or descriptive
words before or after it, is the universal method of signing a
contract to assume a personal obligation."

11 Am. Jur. 2d Bills

and Notes § 556 (1963)(footnotes omitted).
Based on Utah law as well as the law of other
jurisdictions, McClellan is personally liable on the Note.
Answer did not deny the debt.

His

Thus, judgment on the pleadings

was proper where the Note is clear and unambiguous on its face.
II.

THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DENIED
MCCLELLAN'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE
JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS WHICH WAS
BROUGHT OVER EIGHT MONTHS AFTER THE
JUDGMENT WAS ENTERED AND WAS SUPPORTED
ONLY BY INADMISSIBLE HEARSAY EVIDENCE.

The District Court entered its Order, properly granting
Mountain America's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings on
January 23, 1990.

(R. at 41.)

McClellan did not file his Motion
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to Set Aside Judgment until September 24, 1990, over eight months
after the Order had been entered, (R. at 74), and over thirteen
months after the Complaint had been filed, (R. at 2)•

At a

hearing held on October 2, 1990, the District Court denied
McClellan's Motion to Set Aside Judgment.

(R. at 232; Trans, of

Hearing Oct. 2, 1990 at 12-13.)
A.

The proper standard of review to apply
when considering whether a motion to set
aside is properly denied is an abuse of
discretion standard.

McClellan states the second issue for review as
follows: "Did the District Court err in granting judgment on the
pleadings when McClellan, in a specific affidavit, pointed to
discoverable evidence he had not been given an opportunity to
obtain that would establish his defense?"
1.)

(Appellant's Brief at

McClellan incorrectly concludes that this is a "question of

law" standard of review.

Id.

The "discoverable evidence"

McClellan refers to was presented to the District Court in
conjunction with a Motion to Set Aside Judgment.

(R. at 74-84.)

Thus, the proper standard of review to apply is an "abuse of
discretion" standard.

It was within the broad discretion of the

District Court to determine whether the "discoverable evidence"
presented justified setting aside its Order granting judgment in
favor of Mountain America.
Mountain America has attempted to locate case law
governing the specific standard a reviewing court should apply
when examining a trial court's ruling on a motion to set aside
17

judgment.

Not finding any law on this narrow issue, Mountain

America believes that turning to an analogous area of the law
provides the answer.
McClellan's Motion to Set Aside Judgment closely
parallels, inter alia, motions to set aside a default judgment.
The standard of review in this area of the law is well-settled.
The trial court has broad discretion to deny a motion to set
aside a default judgment. Russell v. Martell, 681 P.2d 1193, 1194
(Utah 1984); Gardiner and Gardiner Builders v. Swapp, 656 P.2d
429, 430 (Utah 1982).

The standard was specifically set forth in

Russell. 681 P.2d at 1194, where the court stated that

ff

[b]road

discretion is accorded the trial court in ruling on relief from a
judgment; and, this Court will reverse that ruling only if it is
clear the trial court abused its discretion."

This statement is

broad enough to include a ruling on relief from any judgment, of
which judgment on the pleadings is just one.

As set forth in

Valley Leasing, Etc. v. Houghton. 661 P.2d 959, 960, 960 n.2
(Utah 1983), relief under Rule 60(b) (dealing with motions to set
aside judgment) is not limited to default judgments.
McClellan brought his September 24, 1990 Motion to Set
Aside Judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.

(R. at 74.)

Because McClellan was seeking relief

from a judgment, the proper standard of review to apply is an
abuse of discretion standard.

18

B.

The District Court properly denied
McClellan's Motion to Set Aside Judgment
— a ruling that was clearly within its
broad powers of discretion,

McClellan first argues that he was not given "notice
that matters outside the pleadings would be considered."
(Appellants Brief at 12.)
1.

There is no evidence in the record that
the District Court considered matters
outside the pleadings.

McClellan admits that "[t]he record demonstrates that
prior to entry of the January 23, 1990 order, nothing outside the
pleadings was presented to the court in support of the motion for
judgment on the pleadings."
footnote omitted.)
inconsistent.

(Appellant's Brief at 11-12;

McClellan's position is logically

McClellan cannot reasonably admit that nothing

outside the pleadings was presented to the court, and then turn
around and assert that they should have been given notice that
matters outside the pleadings were to be considered.1
1

This is just one example of McClellan's
largely frivolous arguments. Another example
McClellan's most recent explanation of why it
America's Request No. 1 of Mountain America's
Admissions. The full text of the Request and
follows:

inconsistent and
involves
admitted Mountain
Requests for
Response is as

Request No. 1; Admit that on or about
the 5th day of June, 1984, you executed and
delivered to Plaintiff a Promissory Note and
Disclosure in the amount of $30,420.00 as
secretary of the corporation Calistoga Court
Club, Inc. and personally, a true and correct
copy of which is attached hereto.
Response No. 1:

Admitted.
19

Moreover, the record indicates that the District Court
did not examine any evidence outside the pleadings.
20, 30-42.)

(R. at 15-

Mountain America's Motion for Judgment on the

Pleadings was based on McClellan's Answer, which "[did] not deny
the debt alleged in Plaintiffs Complaint. . . . "

(R. at 17.)

McClellan argues that the District Court may have looked at
McClellan's response to a request for admission when granting its
order.

(Appellant's Brief at 12.)

However, there is no evidence

that the District Court considered said response, or any other
evidence outside the pleadings.

(R. at 15-20, 30-42.)

In sum,

to restate the obvious, there is no requirement that McClellan
receive notice that matters outside the pleadings would be
considered, when in fact, matters outside the pleadings were
never considered.
2.

McClellan had sufficient opportunity to
discover evidence that would establish
his defense.

McClellan argues next that "[d]espite his affidavit,
showing that evidence was discoverable that would establish his
defense, McClellan was not given an opportunity to pursue that
discovery."

(Appellant's Brief at 13; emphasis supplied.)

Not

(R. at 22; emphasis supplied.) McClellan asserts that "[t]he
request establishes, at most, that McClellan personally delivered
the note and was personally present when the note was signed by
him as secretary of the corporation." (Appellant's Brief at 12
n.4.) McClellan's assertion is unreasonable. The Request joins
with the conjunctive "and" both verbs — execute and deliver —
both of which are modified by the phrase "as secretary" and the
phrase "and personally." Thus, McClellan was admitting personal
liability on the Note.
20

only is this inaccurate, but McClellan has misstated the facts.
McClellan never filed an affidavit pursuant to his defense as
described in Appellant's Brief.

Use of the phrase "his

affidavit" referring to McClellan is a serious error.

The

affidavit referred to is that of McClellan's counsel at the time,
James L. Shumate, in which counsel attempted to admit into
evidence the substance of a conversation he had with Mr. Hoyt,
co-maker on the Note.

(Appellant's Brief at 13-14; R. at 81-84.)

Mr. Hoyt allegedly stated that he and McClellan had signed the
Note in their representative capacities as officers of Calistoga
Court Club.

The District Court properly excluded Shumate's

affidavit as inadmissible hearsay.
1990 at 12-13; R. at 232.)

(Trans, of Hearing, Oct. 2,

See also Walker v. Rockv Mt.

Recreation Corp.. 29 Utah 2d 274, 508 P.2d 538 (1973)(holding
hearsay testimony not admissible if testified to at trial may not
be set forth in affidavit supporting summary judgment).
McClellan objects to the District Court's ruling on the
basis that it did not afford him an opportunity to pursue
discovery that would establish his defense.
at 13-14.)

(Appellant's Brief

This objection is simply without merit.

McClellan

had from the time the order was entered until the hearing on his
Motion to Set Aside, a period of over eight months, to discover
evidence on the issue of whether McClellan believed he was
signing the Note in his representative or personal capacity. (R.
at 41, 76.)

If the assertion that McClellan signed only in his

representative capacity actually served as the basis of his
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defense, in reality McClellan had over thirteen months to
discover admissible evidence.

This is the period of time from

the filing of the Complaint until the hearing on McClellan's
Motion to Set Aside.

(R. at 2, 76.)

The District Court properly exercised its discretion in
denying McClellan's Motion to Set Aside based on the fact that
McClellan had at least eight months and as many as thirteen
months to discover admissible evidence, and the best "evidence"
he could produce was inadmissible hearsay.
opportunity to pursue discovery.

There was no lack of

Furthermore, it would have been

improper for the District Court to grant McClellan more time to
pursue discovery on matters that are inadmissible.

As discussed

earlier, extrinsic evidence is inadmissible where the document
involved is clear and unambiguous.
In order to grant McClellan7s Motion to Set Aside based
on the lack of opportunity to pursue discovery, it must be shown
that the "newly discovered evidence could not, with reasonable
diligence, have been discovered and produced" at an earlier time.
See Powers v. Gene's Blda. Materials, Inc.. 567 P.2d 174, 176
(Utah 1977)(deciding analogous question of when new trial should
be granted based on discovery of "new" evidence).

Since Hoyt was

the co-maker of the Note, with reasonable diligence McClellan
could have discovered at a much earlier date whether Hoyt had any
evidence regarding the question of signing capacity.

In short,

McClellan had sufficient opportunity to discover admissible
evidence to support his Motion to Set Aside.
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3.

The affidavit of James L. Shumate could
not have been properly treated as a Rule
56(f) affidavit, and McClellan should
not have been granted an opportunity to
do discovery on the issues.

Mountain America concedes that Rule 56(f) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure allows a party to avoid summary judgment
when there are important facts that are yet to be uncovered
through discovery.

Rule 56(f) provides:

Should it appear from the affidavits of a
party opposing the motion that he cannot for
reasons stated present by affidavit facts
essential to justify his opposition, the
court may refuse the application for judgment
or may order a continuance to permit
affidavits to be obtained or depositions to
be taken or discovery to be had or may make
such other order as is just.
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is entitled "Summary
judgment."

James L. Shumate's affidavit was not submitted as an

affidavit opposing summary judgment.

Shumate's affidavit was

submitted in support of McClellan's Motion to Set Aside a
Judgment on the Pleadings that had been entered against
McClellan.

(R. at 81-84.)

As such, Shumate's affidavit could

not have been treated as a Rule 56(f) affidavit.

Furthermore,

McClellan's counsel never asserted prior to the District Court
ruling on his Motion to Set Aside that Shumate's affidavit ought
to be treated as a Rule 56(f) affidavit, nor did he request that
the District Court grant him more time to conduct discovery.
at 74-90; Trans, of Hearing Oct. 2, 1990.)
Based on the foregoing points and authorities, the
District Court did not abuse its discretion by denying
23

(R.

McClellan's Motion to Set Aside.

The findings of the District

Court should be affirmed.
III. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DENIED
MCCLELLAN'S SECOND MOTION TO SET ASIDE
JUDGMENT WHICH WAS BASED ON MOUNTAIN
AMERICA'S ALLEGED FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH
THE "ONE ACTION" RULE.
Utah's one-action rule provides in relevant part:
"There can be one action for the recovery of any debt or the
enforcement of any right secured solely by mortgage upon real
estate which action must be in accordance with the provisions of
this chapter."

Utah Code Ann. § 78-37-1 (1992).

When the debtor

properly raises the one-action rule as an affirmative defense,
the creditor is forced to exhaust the real property security
before the creditor may obtain a personal judgment on the
underlying note.

City Consumer Services, Inc. v. Peters, 815

P.2d 234, 235 (Utah 1991); J. David Milliner, Real Property
Collateral; The "One-Action" Rule in Action, 1991 Utah L. Rev.
557, 560 (1991).
The District Court's refusal to set aside the January
23, 1990 judgment should be upheld on appeal for several reasons.
First, McClellan was under an obligation to raise the "one
action" rule as an affirmative defense long before raising it in
a Motion to Reconsider and Set Aside Judgment on November 13,
1991.

Second, even if McClellan had properly raised the "one

action" rule as an affirmative defense in a timely manner,
Mountain America qualifies for the junior lienholder exception
under the rule —

obviating the requirement of foreclosing on the
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real property collateral before proceeding against McClellan
personally.

Finally, proceeding against McClellan on the Note

merely operates as a waiver as to Mountain America's option to
foreclose on the real property collateral.
A.

Failing to raise the Mone action" rule
as an affirmative defense, McClellan
waived the right to raise it on a Motion
to Reconsider and Set Aside,

Failure to call the applicability of the one-action
rule to the attention of the court generally precludes the debtor
from gaining any benefit therefrom.

See, e.g., Salter v. Ulrich.

138 P.2d 7, 9 (Cal. 1943); Nevada Wholesale Lumber Co. v. Myers
Realty, Inc., 544 P.2d 1204, 1207 (Nev. 1976).2

In fact, some

cases explicitly hold that "[t]he fact that a note is secured is
an affirmative defense which must be pleaded." See, e.g., Salter,
138 P.2d at 9.
Mountain America filed its Complaint on August 2, 1989.
(R. at 2.)

McClellan filed his Answer, in which the "one action"

rule was not raised as an affirmative defense, on September 12,
1989.

(R. at 9.)

Judgment was entered against McClellan on

California adopted the first one-action rule in 1860. 1860
Cal. Stat. ch. 314, § 23, p. 303-304. By 1911, Idaho, Montana,
Nevada, and Utah adopted similar statutes. J. David Milliner,
Real Property Collateral: The "One-Action" Rule in Action, 1991
Utah L. Rev. 557, 558 (1991). It is a recognized rule of
statutory construction that when the Legislature adopts a statute
from another state, the presumption is that the Legislature is
familiar with that state's judicial interpretations of that
statute and intends to adopt them also. Jensen v. Intermountain
Health Care, Inc., 679 P.2d 903, 904 (Utah 1984). Court
decisions from California and other jurisdictions dealing with
the one-action rule thus become particularly persuasive in Utah
courts.
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January 23, 1990.

(R. at 41.)

It was not until November 13,

1991 that McClellan raised an alleged violation of the "one
action" rule as an affirmative defense in a Motion to Reconsider
and Set Aside Judgment.

(R. at 136.)

Thus, McClellan did not

raise the "one action" rule affirmative defense until more than
twenty-six (26) months after he filed his Answer.

This was also

more than twenty-one (21) months after judgment had been entered
against McClellan.
Not only did McClellan fail to timely raise the
affirmative defense, of the one-action rule in his Answer, but he
attempted to raise the issue in a procedurally defective manner.
In order to properly raise an affirmative defense after the
responsive pleading has been filed, the party that wishes to
raise the defense must move for leave of the court to file an
amended answer.
(Utah 1974).

Olpin v. Grove Finance Co.. 521 P.2d 1221, 1223

McClellan never moved the court for leave to file

an amended answer in order to raise the affirmative defense of
violation of the one action rule.
The manner in which McClellan raised the issue of the
one-action rule was grossly untimely.

Furthermore, it was in

violation of established procedural requirements for properly
raising an affirmative defense after a responsive pleading has
been filed.

Thus, McClellan should have been barred from raising

the issue.
By way of providing some background, it is important to
recognize that the "one action" rule is currently applied two
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ways.

See J. David Milliner, Real Property Collateral: The "One-

Action" Rule in Action, 1991 Utah L. Rev. 557, 560 (1991).
First, the debtor can assert the rule as an affirmative defense,
forcing the creditor to first foreclose on the real property
collateral.

Id.

Second, where the creditor proceeds against the

debtor personally on a note, although not raised as an
affirmative defense, the debtor can assert the rule as a sanction
against the creditor, operating as a waiver of the creditor7s
right to foreclose its original lien.

Id. at 561.

(See

subsection "C" below discussing how the sanction aspect of the
one-action rule operates in this case.)
Even though a debtor may fail to raise the one-action
rule as an affirmative defense and later impose the "sanction"
application of the rule, it does not mean a debtor can raise the
rule as an affirmative defense on a motion to set aside after
judgment has already been entered.
of Civil Procedure provides:

Rule 8(c) of the Utah Rules

"In a pleading to a preceding

pleading, a party shall set forth affirmatively accord and
satisfaction . . . estoppel . . . and any other matter
constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense."
supplied.)

(Emphasis

McClellan's Answer to Mountain America's complaint

did not set forth the one-action rule as an affirmative defense.
(R. at 9-11.)
Rule 12(h) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states
that "[a] party waives all defenses and objections which he does
not present . . . in his answer or reply . . . ." Rule 12(h)
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operates concurrently with Rule 8(c) as a waiver of defenses.
For example, in Manger v. Davis. 619 P.2d 687, 692 (Utah 1980),
the Court held that the failure to plead estoppel as a defense
under Rule 8(c) waives the defense under Rule 12(h).

Estoppel is

one of the defenses listed in Rule 8(c) that one must assert in a
responsive pleading.

Under the rationale in Manger, McClellan

has waived the right to assert the one-action affirmative defense
under Rule 8(c) because it constitutes "any other matter
constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense'..11
The policy behind these rules is well-founded.

If a

party-defendant were able to raise an affirmative defense at any
time in a proceeding, the wheels of justice would come to a
grinding halt.

Raising one defense after another, following the

failure of each preceding defense, one could unjustly delay the
resolution of disputes.

Such a rationale would be contrary to

our notions of specidy trial, fair administration of justice,
judicial economy, and common decency.
That failure to raise an affirmative defense operates
as a waiver prevents unjust results.
the case at bar —

It is especially germane to

McClellan should be precluded from raising the

affirmative defense of the one-action rule more than two years
after he filed his responsive pleading.

A different result may

be warranted were McClellan an individual who did not have at his
disposal all the facts necessary to assert the one-action rule as
an affirmative defense to his personal liability on the debt.
However, this is not the case here.
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McClellan himself signed the

Trust Deed, securing the loan from Horizon Thrift, Mountain
States' predecessor in interest.

(R. at 186.)

McClellan was

aware of the existence of real property collateral since June 5,
1984.

(R. at 184.)

Thus, McClellan was aware of all facts

necessary to timely raise the one-action rule as an affirmative
defense.

Failing to raise the defense, McClellan should now be

barred from doing so.
B.

Assuming, arguendo, McClellan had
properly raised the one-action rule as
an affirmative defense. Mountain States
would still prevail based on the "junior
lienholder" exception to the one-action
rule.

The one-action rule has no application in this case.
In Cache Valley Banking Co. v. Logan Lodge No. 1453, 88 Utah 577,
583, 56 P.2d 1046, 1049 (1936), the Utah Supreme Court held that
"where the security has been lost through no fault of the
mortgagee, an action may be maintained directly upon the personal
obligation evidenced by the note without going through the idle
and fruitless procedure of foreclosure." More recently, the
Court reiterated Utah's adoption of the "junior lienholder
exception" in City Consumer Services, Inc. v. Peters, 815 P.2d
234, 237 (Utah 1991).

Mountain America qualifies for the junior

lienholder exception.

Because the senior lienholder foreclosed

on the real property securing the Note, Mountain America can
properly bring suit against McClellan personally.
Zion's First National Bank, the senior lienholder on
the real property collateral, became beneficiary under a Trust
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Deed securing a $10,106.00 loan, executed March 26, 1984, and
recorded March 28, 1984.

(See Addendum Exhibit "B".)

Horizon

Thrift, Mountain America's predecessor in interest, as junior
lienholder, became beneficiary under a Trust Deed securing a
$31,910.58 loan, executed June 5, 1984, and recorded June 18,
1984.

(See Addendum Exhibit "C"; R. at 184.)

Because Utah is a

race-notice jurisdiction, the first trust deed recorded has
priority.

Utah Code Ann. § 57-3-3; Neeley v. Kelsch, 600 P.2d

979 (Utah 1979).

Based on the foregoing, Mountain America

qualifies as a junior lienholder.
On September 6, 1988, the senior lienholder foreclosed
on the real property securing Mountain America's loan.

(R. at

182; a copy of the Trustee's Deed is attached hereto as Addendum
Exhibit

fl fl

D .)

Because Mountain America qualifiers as a junior

lienholder, and the senior lienholder foreclosed on the property,
rendering it valueless, Mountain America can proceed against
McClellan personally on the Note.
1.

The typographical error in the l€*cral
description of Zion's prior recorded
deed is not fatal and does not render
Zions subordinate to Mountain America.

The senior lienholder's deed, recorded March 28, 1984,
contained a typographical error in the legal description of the
property.
"C".)

(Compare Addendum Exhibit "B" with Addendum Exhibit

The error was found in one digit of one of the numerical

measurements —

"116.37 ft." should have been "14.6.37 ft."

Zion's rerecorded the deed on February 19, 1988, with the correct
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digit.

(See Addendum Exhibit "E".)

It is important to point out

that this was the only error in the description.

Because of this

typographical error, McClellan argues that "Mountain America's
lienholder position was in fact that of a senior creditor."
(Appellant's Brief at 19.)
Such a minor error does not constitute a sufficiently
material flaw so as to place Mountain America in the position of
senior lienholder.

The description found in the first deed was

materially sufficient to place anyone on notice that this
particular piece of property was encumbered.

Utah law stipulates

that "[a] recorded document imparts notice of its contents
regardless of any defect, irregularity, or omission in its
execution, attestation, or acknowledgment."
4a-2 (1990).

Utah Code Ann. § 57-

It is commonly accepted that

property covered by [a] mortgage will be held
to be described with sufficient accuracy, and
will impart constructive notice through the
operation of the recording statutes, if one
examining the mortgage may, from the language
of the mortgage and the information gained
from the inquiry clearly suggested by the
language of the mortgage, identify the
specific land intended to be included.
Washington v. Slack. 813 P.2d 447, 450 (Mont. 1991)(deed with
minor error in legal description still imparted constructive
notice and did not effect priority date).
Based on Utah law and commonly accepted principles of
notice law, Mountain America did not move into a senior
lienholder position as the result of a one-digit typographical
error in the property description.
31

More importantly, McClellan

was never affected by the one-digit error in the* land
description.

Normally, one who relies to their detriment on an

erroneously recorded deed can seek relief for such reliance.
McClellan never detrimentally relied on Zion's prior recorded
deed.
2•

Mountain America had no obligation to
allege and prove that a senior
lienholder foreclosed on and rendered
valueless the real property collateral.

In Lockhart Co. v. Eguitable Realty, Inc., 657 P.2d
1333, 1336 (Utah 1983), the Utah Supreme Court limited the
"junior lienholder" exception to the one-action rule.

In

Lockhart, the debtor alleged by way of affirmative defense in
their answer, that the creditor had failed to exhaust their
security interest before resorting to an action on the note.

Id.

at 1334. Nevertheless, the creditor attempted to maintain an
action based on a "speculated or estimated deficiency" because a
senior lienholder's interest appeared to exceed the value of the
property and would thus render the junior lienholder's interest
of no value.

Id.

The Lockhart court held that the creditor in

this case must allege and prove that the security had become
valueless, and not merely "speculate that the security is
valueless, or might become valueless if foreclosed by the senior
lienholder."

Idk. at 1336.

McClellan asserts that Mountain America "has failed to
show anything in the record where it has alleged or proved the
exhaustion of the collateral."

(Appellant's Brief at 19.)
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Furthermore, McClellan argues based on the Lockhart decision,
that Mountain America must allege and prove that the property was
valueless.

(Appellant's Brief at 19.)

In short, McClellan's

argument misconstrues one-action law altogether.
First, as set forth above, the one-action rule is an
affirmative defense that the debtor must raise or it is waived.
It is not incumbent on the creditor to allege compliance
therewith before proceeding on a note.

McClellan never properly

raised the one-action rule as an affirmative defense.
Second, the Lockhart decision was based on the fact
that the debtor had raised the issue of noncompliance with the
one-action rule as an affirmative defense in their answer.
one-action rule had been properly placed in issue.

The

The creditor

in Lockhart failed to respond to the debtor's affirmative
defense, thus the court properly found in favor of the debtor
based on the creditor's failure to allege and prove that the
security had become valueless.

Again, McClellan never placed the

one-action rule in issue in this case, and accordingly, Mountain
America never had a burden to allege and prove that the security
had become valueless.
Third, the Lockhart decision is pragmatically confined
to its facts.

Lockhart is significant because the junior

creditor had proceeded against the debtor prior to the
consummation of the foreclosure action prosecuted by the senior
creditor.

Lockhart, 657 P.2d at 1336.

For this reason, Lockhart

was able to distinguish the Cache Valley decision which held that
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"where the security has been lost through no fault of the
mortgagee, an action may be maintained directly upon the personal
obligation evidenced by the note without going through the idle
and fruitless procedure of foreclosure."

Lockhart, 657 P.2d at

1336 (quoting Cache Valley. 88 Utah at 583, 56 P.2d at 1049).

In

Cache Vallev. 88 Utah at 579-80, 56 P.2d at 1047, the senior
lienholder had for€»closed on the security prior to the junior
lienholder commencing an action on the note.
decision is controlling in this case.

The Cache Vallev

Zion/s Bank, the senior

lienholder foreclosed on the property prior to the commencement
of this action.

To require Mountain America to allege and prove

that the security had been rendered valueless would amount to
another "idle and fruitless procedure."
In short, Mountain America is under no duty to allege
and prove that the security has become valueless.

McClellan

bears the burden of first putting the question at issue by
raising the one-action rule as an affirmative defense.

Lockhart

is easily distinguishable from the facts of the case at bar.

As

Lockhart specifically sets forth, the Cache Valley decision is
controlling because the property here was rendered valueless
prior to the commencement of this action.
C.

The "sanction" application of the oneaction rule would merely operate as a
waiver of Mountain America's option to
foreclose on the secured propertyr and
McClellan would still be personally
liable on the debt.

Assuming, arguendo, that McClellan did not have an
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obligation to raise the one-action rule as an affirmative defense
and that Mountain America does not qualify for the junior
lienholder exception, proceeding against McClellan personally on
the Note only waives Mountain America's option to foreclose on
the secured property.
above, pages 17-18.)

(See discussion of "sanction" application
Where a creditor brings an action against

the debtor personally before the real property collateral has
been exhausted, then the creditor is open to sanction.

The

"sanction" application of the one-action rule has been described
as follows:
Although the debtor may have failed to use
the rule as an affirmative defense, the
debtor can still assert the rule as a
sanction against the creditor for not having
first foreclosed on the security. In this
case the creditor has violated the * security
first' principle of the rule, waived its
security in the collateral, and thereby lost
the right to foreclose its original lien.
J. David Milliner, Real Property Collateral; The "One-Action"
Rule in Action, 1991 Utah L. Rev. 557, 558 (1991).

Thus,

assuming Mountain America has proceeded against McClellan in
violation of the one-action rule, at most, Mountain America has
lost the right to foreclose on the real property collateral.
This is a nullity since the senior lienholder foreclosed on the
security prior to the commencement of this action in the District
Court.
The "sanction" application of the one-action rule is
consistent with the original intent of one-action statutes.
There is evidence that state legislatures intended to force
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creditors to elect between either foreclosing on the security or
seeking a personal judgment on the note.

Note, Mortgage

Foreclosure; The One Action Rule in Utah, 6 Utah L. Rev. 560, 560
(1959); Bacon v. Ravbould, 4 Utah 357, 360, 10 P. 481, 482-83,
reh'cr denied. 4 Utah 357, 11 P. 510 (1886).

Sanctioning the

creditor, by causing a forfeiture of the right to foreclose on
the security when proceeding against the debtor personally,
preserves the "one action" nature of the one-action rule.
As the case law illustrates, this is the most commonly
employed sanction against the creditor who violates the oneaction rule.

The California Supreme Court has stated the

principle as follows;
If the debtor successfully raises the [rule]
as an affirmative defense, the creditor will
be forced to exhaust the security before he
may obtain a money judgment against the
debtor for any deficiency. If the debtor
does not raise the [rule] as an affirmative
defense, he may still invoke it as a sanction
against the creditor on the basis that the
latter by not foreclosing on the security in
the action brought to enforce the debt, has
made an election of remedies and waiveid the
security.
Walker v. Community Bank. 518 P.2d 329, 332 (Cal. 1974).

The

California Supreme Court most recently reaffirmed the "waiver of
security" principle in Security Pacific Nat'l Bank v. Wozab, 800
P.2d 557, 563 (Cal. 1990).

See also Nevada Wholesale Lumber Co.

v. Mvers Realty. Inc.. 544 P.2d 1204, 1208 (Nev. 1976)(Nevada's
adoption of the "waiver of security" principle).
A different sanction involves the complete forfeiture
of the remaining debt.

Milliner at 562.
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"In the few cases that

have imposed this sanction, the courts have forfeited the debt
after concluding that a creditor had completed its one action
without collecting the entire debt."

Id.

Any additional attempt

to collect the debt is considered to be an attempt to violate the
"one action" principle of the rule.

Id.

Interestingly, the

California Supreme Court recently held that in order to invoke a
sanction that involves the forfeiture of the remaining debt,
there must have been a prior judicial action.

Wozab, 800 P.2d at

561 (1990).

This type of forfeiture sanction is not available in

this case.

The action brought in the District Court is the first

and only action brought to recover the debt.

There has been no

prior judicial action that would violate the "one action" nature
of the rule, and justify the creditor forfeiting the remainder of
the debt.
IV.

THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DENIED
MCCLELLAN'S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE A
THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT AND TO ASSERT A
CROSS CLAIM.

Pursuant to Rule 13(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, a party may plead a "cross-claim . . . against a coparty arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the
subject matter of the original transaction. . . . "
P. 13(f).

Utah R. Civ.

Once a responsive pleading has been filed, "a party

may amend his [or her] pleading only by leave of court or by
written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely
given when justice so requires." Utah R. Civ. P. 15(a).
McClellan filed his Motion for Leave to File a Third37

Party Complaint and to Assert a Cross-claim on October 28, 1991.
(R. at 111.)

This motion was twelve months after McClellan,s

first Motion to Set Aside was denied (R. at 88), twenty-one
months after judgment had been entered against McClellan (R. at
41-42), and over two years after McClellan filed his Answer (R.
at 9-11).
Judgment had already been entered against McClellan
when he brought the Motion for Leave to File a Third-Party
Complaint and to Assert a Cross-claim.

(R. at 41-42, 111.)

McClellan could not amend an answer (his relevant "pleading")
pursuant to Rule 15(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
without first moving the court to set aside the previously
rendered judgment against him.

Any motion to amend his answer,

if granted, would become meaningless if the judgment against him
remained in place.
Moreover, the District Court's denial of McClellan's
Motion for Leave was not an abuse of discretion.

It is beyond

dispute that even though Rule 15 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure favors granting leave to amend, "the matter remains in
the sound discretion of the trial court."

Westley v. Farmer's

Ins. Exchange. 663 P.2d 93, 94 (Utah 1983).
There are two issues, inter alia, that the reviewing
court examines when determining whether the trial abused its
discretion in denying leave to amend a pleading.

First, by

McClellan's own admission, "[c]ourts are much less likely to
grant an amendment when the amendment will delay the adjudication
38

of the case.11

(Appellant's brief at 21; citing Girard v.

Appleby. 660 P.2d 245 (Utah 1983); Hein's Turkey Hatcheries. Inc,
v, Nephi Processing Plaint. Inc., 24 Utah 2d 271, 470 P.2d 257
(Utah 1970)).

McClellan's Motion for Leave came unreasonably

late in the proceeding —

twenty-one months after judgment had

been entered against McClellan (R. at 41-42), and over two years
after McClellan filed his Answer (R. at 9-11).

Moreover,

McClellan filed his Motion for Leave just two months before the
entry of final judgment.

(R. at 190-93.)

By this time, the case

had progressed so far that it was ripe for final judgment.
Certainly, in the interest of judicial economy, the District
Court was well within its discretion in denying McClellan's
Motion for Leave.

See, e.g.. Tripp v. Vaughn. 746 P.2d 794, 798

(Utah App. 1987)(denial of motion to allow counter-claim and
third party complaint 13 months after filing answer not an abuse
of discretion).
Second, reviewing courts examine whether the substance
of the moving parties "new" allegation was known prior to
bringing the motion.

Westley. 663 P.2d at 94. McClellan was, or

should have been aware at all times of any potential liability of
Hoyt, the co-maker of the Note, or any shareholders of Calistoga
Court Club.

The Note signed by McClellan included Hoyt's

signature, as well as the designation of Calistoga as a co-maker.
(R. at 4.)

Surely McClellan had all the material facts necessary

to form the basis of any theories of joint liability or
indemnification since the filing of the Complaint on August 2,
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1989,
The District Court did not abuse its discretion.
McClellan/s Motion for Leave was untimely.

Moreover, McClellan

at all relevant times had all the information necessary to bring
a cross-claim or third party complaint, but for some reason did
not do so.

This Court should affirm the District Court's denial

of McClellan's Motion for Leave as a decision that accords with
its broad powers of discretion.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing points and authorities, the
District Court's Order granting judgment on the pleadings in
favor of Mountain America, as well as its refusal to set aside
judgment or grant leave to file a cross claim and third party
claims should all be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted this

<^> day of July 1992.
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TRUST DEED
WITH ASSIGNMENT OF RENTS
2 6 t h

THIS TRUST DEED, made this

day of

March

^ 1 9 _84^

^ ^

- CALISTOGA COURT CLUB, INC, a Utah Corporation, Edward Burgess, President;
Curtis Lang, S e c r e t a r y / t r e a s u r e r P

whose address is

- °-

B

nTRUSTOR

°* * g

Cedar_City

(Stnwt and Numbtr)

Utah

(City)

(Stat*)

ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK

authorized to do business
in Utah, under the laws of Utah, and in such capacity herein called TRUSTEE, and THE LOCKHART CO.. a Utah Corporation,
and in such capacity herein called BENEFICIARY, for whose benefit this Trust Deed is given.
WITNESSETH: That Trustor CONVEYS AND WARRANTS TO TRUSTEE IN TRUST, WITH POWER OF SALE, the following
IRON
described property, situated In
Z-Z2
County, State of Utah:

Beginning S 0 18 f 27 M E, 1408.40 f t . along the s e c t i o n l i n e and N 71°44 , 14 M W,
2038.06 f t . from the Efc corner s e c t i o n 3 5 , T35St R11W, SLM; thence S IB°15^69'
W, 116.37 f t . , thence S 43 00*00" W, 91.18 f t ; thence along the arc of a curve
to the l e f t , (radius point for which bears S 43°00 , 00 M W, 100.00 f t . ) , a
distance of 43.17 f t ; thence N 71°44 f 14 n Wf 95.00 f t ; thence N 18°15 , 46 M E,
220.00 f t ; thence S 71°44 f i4"E f 175.00 f t . along the S'ly l i n e Fiddlers
Canyon access road t o the point of beginning. Containing 0.858 acres of land.

•2S1A26
Recorded at
Runu^trw

D»*
Fee

1—

Utah

8

^720

-

Company

r.mo
Time.

11 a . m

Z-00
Bnm. 3 1 5
p, n o
338-340
By CORA J. HULET. IRON COUNTY REJCQKbER

Fiddlers Canyon, :
(Strttt)

The L o c k h a r t

HA&2 8 1984

RetdD

which has an address of

m,

InoVdD

Abet d i g /

"
Proof D

Cedar City, Utah
__

(City)

("Property Address").

(Zip COd«)

Together with all buildings, fixtures and improvements thereon or hereafter erected and all water rights, rights of way. easements, rents, issues, profits, income, tenements, hereditaments, privileges and appurtenances thereunto belonging, now or
hereafter used or enjoyed with said property, or any part thereof, SUBJECT, HOWEVER, to the right, power and authority hereinafter given to and conferred upon Beneficiary to collect and apply such rents, issues, and profits;
FOR THE PURPOSE OF SECURING in such order as Beneficiary may elect (1) payment of the indebtedness evidenced
by a promissory note of even date herewith, in the principal sum of $_ X01Q6.QQ
— , made by Trustor, payable to
the order of Beneficiary at the times, in the manner and with interest as therein set forth, and any extensions and/or renewals
or modifications thereof; (2) the performance of each agreement of Trustor herein contained; (3) the payment of such additional loans or advances as hereafter may be made to Trustor, or his successors or assigns, when evidenced by a promissory
note or notes reciting that they are secured by this Trust Deed, and (4) the payment of all sums expended or advanced by
Beneficiary under or pursuant to the terms hereof, together with interest thereon as herein provided.
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TRUST DEED
W I T H A S S I G N M E N T O F RENTS

THIS TRUST DEED, made this

§£fe

day of

MhBCH

,

19

_OU

9mong

- CALI3T0GA COURT CIXJB, IMC, i Utah CorporatioD, Edward Bargee* President,
Ourtia Lang. Sec« Treasurer whose address Is

E«0> BOX ^ 3 ,

M

CBDAR CITY,

(StrMt Mid Number)

UTAH

TRUSTOR,

81ff20

(City)

(SUM)

ZIONS FIRST MATIOMAL BAHK Hk

authorized to do business

in Utah, under the laws of Utah, and in such capacity herein called TRUSTEE and THE LOCKHART C O . a Utah Corporation,
and in such capacity herein called BENEFICIARY, for whose benefit this Trust Deed is given
WITNESSETH That Trustor CONVEYS AND WARRANTS TO TRUSTEE IN TRUST. WITH POWER OF SALE, the following
described property, tituttod m

±E2l

County, State of Utah

Beginning S 0°18,27,« E, 1408.40 ft. along the section line and N 71 44'14" W,
2038.06 ft. from the Ei corner section 35, T35S, R11W, SLM; thence S 18 15*46"
V, 146.37 ft., thence S 43°00'00" W, 91.18 ft; thence along the arc of a curve
to the left, (radius point for which bears S 43°00,00" W, 100.00 ft.), a
distance of 43.17 ft; thence N 71°44,14" W, 95.00 ft; thence N 18°15,46" E,
220.00 ft; thence S 71°44,14M E, 175.00 ft. along the S'ly line Fiddlers
Canyon access road to the point of beginning. Containing 0.858 acres of land.
This

Trust Deed is being re-^rBonrded to correct the legal description.
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fltqut* of

SECURITY TITLE CO SO UT

FEB 19 1988

.sas^
$9

ZJ.

oo

Book

^j*

375- «

907-910 5 f c C u R i rt TITLE COMPANY
**/3>#2«£- / ^ - ^ S i "

By O W E 8 UATMESON, IRON (XXJNTY RECORDER

R*dO

***D

«**£

*«*D

C j HULET. IRON COUNTY REC
lnd*'d D

, fchasfcan address
^
which
of,

w
FIEDLERS
±^±u***> CANTON,
' u w y CEEAR
\*nu*u\ CITT,
VJ.± ±f UTAH
w^rw
(Stfwt)

UUh

txfiTO

Abetd Q

(City)

("Pro^rty Address").

(Zip C o * )

Together with all buildings fixtures and improvements thereon or hereafter erected and all water rights rights of way, easements rents, issues, profits, income, tenements, hereditaments, privileges and appurtenances thereunto belonging now or
hereafter used or enjoyed with said property, or any part thereof. SUBJECT. HOWEVER, to the right, power and authority hereinafter given to and conferred upon Beneficiary to collect and apply such rents, issues, and profits.
FOR THE PURPOSE OF SECURING in such order as Beneficiary may elect (1) payment of the indebtedness evidenced
by a promissory note of even date herewith, in the principal sum of $ _ & 8 3 3 3 L * 8 0
made by Trustor payable to
the order of Beneficiary at the times. In the manner and with interest as therein set forth and any extensions and/or renewals
or modifications thereof, (2) the performance of each agreement of Trustor herein contained, (3) the payment of such additional loans or advances as hereafter may be made to Trustor, or his successors or assigns, when evidenced by a promissory
note or notes reciting that they are secured by this Trust Deed, and (4) the payment of all sums expended or advanced by
Beneficiary under or pursuant to the terms f p f > f t f # f i f t h ^ ) j M interest thereon as herein provided.
— •> * / >

w« 375 rut 907
1200-0040 10/S2

TO PROTECT AND MAINTAIN THE SECURITY OF THIS TRUST DEED. TRUSTOR AGREES.
1 To pay. perform, observe and discharge each and every condition, obligation, covenant and agreement for which this
irusf Deed has been given as security as provided above.
2 To keep said property in good condition and repair: not to remove or demolish any building thereon; to complete or
roatore promptly and in good and workmanlike manner any building which may be constructed, damaged or destroyed thereon;
to comply with all Jaws, covenants and restrictions affecting said property; not to commit or permit waste thereof; not to commit suffer or permi\ any act upon said property in violation of law; to do all other acts which from the character or use of said
property may be reasonably necessary, the specific enumerations herein not excluding the general.
3 If the loan #4ecureel hereby or any part thereof is being obtained for the purpose of financing construction of improvemerrts on said property. Trustor agrees (a) to commence construction promptly and to pursue the same with reasonable diligence
to completion In accordance with plans and specifications satisfactory to Beneficiary, and (b) to allow Beneficiary to inspect the
property at aft times during construction.
In the event Trustor does not complete construction of the improvements in accordance with the plans and specifications
and to the satisfaction of Beneficiary within eighteen months from the date hereof, unless otherwise extended by the Beneficiary at its option, or if work on such construction should cease before completion and the work should remain abandoned
for a period of 30 days, then and in either event. Beneficiary at its option may declare the entire indebtedness secured by
this Trust Deed together with interest thereon, to be immediately due and payable.
4. To provide and maintain insurance, of such type or types and amounts as Beneficiary may require, on the improvements now existing or hereafter erected or placed on said property. Such insurance shall be carried in companies approved
by Beneficiary with loss payable clauses in favor of and in form acceptable to Beneficiary. In event of loss. Trustor shall give
immediate notice to Beneficiary, who may make proof of loss, and eacn insurance company concerned is hereby authorized and
directed to make payment for such loss directly to Beneficiary instead of to Trustor and Beneficiary jointly, and the insurance
proceeds or any p a l thereof, may be applied by Beneficiary, at its option, to the reduction of the indebtedness hereby secured
or to the restoration or repair of the property damaged.
5 To deliver to. pay for and maintain with Beneficiary until the indebtedness secured hereby is paid in full, such evidence
of title as Beneficiary may require including abstracts of title or policies of title insurance and any extensions or renewals
thereof or supplements thereto
6 To appear in and defend any action or proceeding purporting to affect the security hereof, the title to said property.
oi the rights or powers of Beneficiary or Trustee: and should Beneficiary or Trustee elect to also appear in or defend any such
action or proceeding, to pay all costs and expenses, including cost of evidence of title and attorney's fees in a reasonable sum
.ncurred by Beneficiary or Trustee.
7 To pay at least 10 days before delinquency alt taxes and assessments affecting said property, including all assessments
upon water company stock and all rents, assessments and charges for water, appurtenant to or used in connection with said
property; to pay. when due, all encumbrances, charges, and liens with interest, on said property or any part thereof, which at
any time appear to be prior or superior hereto; to pay all costs, fees and expenses of this Trust Deed.
8. To promptly and completely observe, perform, and discharge each and every condition, covenant and agreement affecting the property which is or may be prior and superior hereto including specifically any other mortgage. Trust Deed or other
security interest which constitutes a lien against the property. Any default by Trustor in the payment or performance of any
condition, covenant or agreement under a prior and superior mortgage, trust deed or other security interest shall constitute a
default hereunder and Beneficiary, at its option may declare all sums secured hereby to be immediately due and payable.
if the security hereunder is or will be a condominium, community apartment or part of a planned development. Trustor
agrees to perform each and every provision under any Declaration of Covenants. Conditions and Restrictions pertaining to the
jondomimum community apartment or planned development project.
9 Should Trustor fail to make any payment or to do any act as herein provided, then Beneficiary or Trustee, but without
obligation so to do and without notice to or demand upon Trustor and without releasing Trustor from any obligation hereof,
may Make or do the same in such manner and to such extent as either may deem necessary to protect the security hereof.
Beneficiary or Trustee being authorized to enter upon said property for such purposes, commence, appear in and defend any
action or proceeding purporting to affect the security hereof or the rights or powers of Beneficiary or Trustee; pay. purchase,
contest or compromise any encumbrance, charge or lien which in the judgment of either appears to be prior or superior
hereto: and in exercising any such powers, incur any liability, expend whatever amounts in its absolute discretion it may deem
necessary therefor, including disbursements for evidence of title, and reasonable attorney s fees
10 Trustor will immediately pay to Beneficiary or Trustee, upon demand, all sums which may be advanced from time to
time by Beneficiary or Trustee for Taxes, assessments, water rates and governmental charges, insurance on the premises,
maintaining this Trust Deed as a valid and subsisting lien upon the premises including but not limited to advancing payments
on a pnor mortgage. Trust Deed or other security interest to avoid any default thereunder, and for any other proper cost or
expenses of preserving, repairing and maintaining the premises or the lien of this Trust Deed. All such advances shall be
optional on the part of Trustee or Beneficiary, and if made shall be secured by the lien of this Trust Deed, and each such
advance shall bear interest from the date thereof at the rate provided for in the promissory note for which this Trust Deed is
given as security
IT IS MUTUALLY AGREED THAT:
i t If all or any part of the property or an interest therein is sold or transferred by Trustor without the prior written consent of Beneficiary. Beneficiary may at its option, declare all sums secured by this Trust Deed to be immediately due and
payable. Consent to one tuch transaction by the Beneficiary shall not constitute a waiver of the right to require such consent
to future or successive transactions.
If Trustor is a corporation, trust, limited or general partnership or joint venture, should there occur a sale, conveyance,
transfer, disposition or encumbrance either voluntarily or involuntarily or should an agreement be entered into to accomplish
the same with respect to: (a) more than twenty-five percent (25%) of the issued and outstanding stock if Trustor is a corporation, (b) the beneficial interest if Trustor is a trust, or (c) any general partnership or joint venture interest if Trustor is a limited
or general partnership or n joint venture; or if there shall occur a change in any general partner or joint venturer if Trustor is
a limned or general partnership or joint venture, then Beneficiary may. at is option, declare all sums secured by this Trust Deed
to be immediately due and payable. Consent to one such transaction shall not constitute a waiver of the right to require such
consent to future or successive transactions.
12 Should said property ot any part thereof be taken or damaged by reason of any public improvement or condemnation proceeding or damaged by fire, or earthquake, or In any other manner. Beneficiary shall be entitled to all compensation,
awards and other payments or relief therefor, and shall be entitled at its option to commence, appear in and prosecute in its
own name, any action or procedlngs. or to make any compromise or settlement, in connection with such taking or damage.
A.I sucn compensation, awards, damages, rights of action and proceeds, including the proceeds of any policies of fire and
otner insurance affecting said property, are hereby assigned to Beneficiary, who may. after deducting therefrom all its expenses,
including attorneys fees, apply the same on any indebtedness secured hereby. Trustor agrees to execute such further
assignments of any compensation, award, damages, and rights of action and proceeds as Beneficiary or Trustee may require.
13 Without affecting the liability of any person, including Trustor, for the payment of any indebtedness secured hereby,
or the lien of this Trust Deed on the remainder of the property for the full amount of any indebtedness unpaid, Beneficary
and Trustee are respectively empowered as follows: Beneficiary may from time to time and without notice (a) release any person liable for the payment of any of the indebtedness, (b) extend the time or otherwise alter the terms of payment of any of
the indebtedness, (c) alter, substitute or release any property securing the indebtedness; Trustee may, at any time, and from
time to time, upon the written request of Beneficiary (a) consent to the making of any map or plat of the property, (b) join in
granting any easement or creating any restriction thereon, (c) join in any subordination or other agreement affecting this Trust
Deed or the lien or charge thereof, (d) reconvey, without warranty, all or any part of the property.
14. The indebtedness secured by these trusts may now or hereafter be further secured by security agreements, mortgages,
deeds of trust, pledges, contracts or guaranty or other additional securities. Beneficiary or Trustee may. at the option of both
or either of them, exhaust any one or more of said securities as well as the security hereunder, either concurrently or independently, and in such* order as they or either of them may determine, and apply the proceeds received upon the indebtedness
secured hereby without affecting that status of. or waiving any right to exhaust all or any other security, including the security
hereunder, and without waiving any breach or default or any right of power, whether exercised hereunder or contained herein.
o, many such o.h.r security.
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15. As additional security. Trustor hereby assigns to Beneficiary, during the continuance of these trusts, ail rents, issues,
royalties, and profits of the property affected by this Trust Deed and of any personal property located thereon. Until Trustor
shall default in the payment of any indebtedness secured hereby or in the performance of any agreement hereunder. Trustor
shall have the right to collect all such rmnts. issues, royalties, and profits earned prior to default as they become due and
payable. If Trustor shall default as aforesaid. Trustor's right to collect any of such moneys shall cease and Beneficiary shall
have the right, with or without taking possession of the property affected hereby, to collect all rents, royalties, issues, and
profits. Failure or discontinuance of Beneficiary at any time or from time to time to collect any such moneys snail not in any
manner affect the subsequent enforcement by Beneficiary of the right, power, and authority to collect the same. Nothing contained herein, nor the exercise of the right by Beneficiary to collect, shall be, or be construed to be an affirmation by Beneficiary of any tenancy, lease or option, nor an assumption of liability under, nor a subordination of the lien or charge of this
Trust Deed to any such tenancy, lease or option.
16. Upon any default by Trustor hereunder. Beneficiary may at any time without notice, either in person, by agent, or by
a receiver to be appointed by a court (Trustor hereby consenting to the appointment of Beneficiary as such receiver), and
without regard to the adequacy of any security for the indebtedness hereby secured, enter upon and take possession of said
property or any part thereof, in its own name sue for or otherwise collect said rents, issues, and profits, including those past
due and unpaid, and apply the same, less costs and expenses of operation and collection, including reasonable attorney's fees,
upon any indebtedness secured hereby, and in such order as Beneficiary may determine.
17. The entering upon and taking possession of said property, the collection of such rents, issues. Mnd profits, or the
proceeds of fire and other insurance policies, or compensation or awards for any taking or damage of said property, and the
application or release thereof as-aforesaid, shall not cure or waive any default or notice of default hereunder or invalidate any
act done pursuant to such notice.
18. The failure on the part of Beneficiary to promptly enforce any right hereunder shall not operate as a waiver of such
right and the waiver by Beneficiary of any default shall not constitute a waiver of any other or subsequent default.
19. Time is of the essence hereof. Upon default by Trustor in the payment of any indebtedness secured hereby or in the
performance of any agreement hereunder, all sums secured hereby shall immediately become due and payable at the option
of Beneficiary. In the event of such default. Beneficiary may execute or cause Trustee to execute a written notice of default
and of election to cause said property to be sold to satisfy the obligations hereof, and trustees shall file such notice for record
in each county wherein said property or some part of parcel thereof is situated. Beneficiary also shall deposit with Trustee the
note and all documents evidencing expenditures secured hereby
20. After the lapse of such time as may then be required by taw following the recordation of said notice of default, and
notice of default and notice of sale having been given as then required by law. Trustee, without demand on Trustor, shall sell
said property on the date and at the time and place designated in said notice of sale, either as a whole or in separate parcels,
and in such order as it may determine (but subject to any statutory right of Trustor to direct the order in which such property,
if consisting of several known lots or parcels, shall be sold), at public auction to the highest bidder, the purchase price payable
in lawful money of the United States at the time of sale. The person conducting the sale may, for any cause he deems
expedient, postpone the sale from time to time until it shall be completed and. in every such case, notice of postponement
shall be given by public declaration thereof by such person at the time and piece last appointed for the sale; provided, if the
sale is postponed for longer than one day beyond the day designated in the notice of sale, notice thereof shall be given in
the same manner as the original notice of sale. Trustee shall execute and deliver to the purchaser its Deed conveying said
property so sold, but without any covenant or warranty, express or implied. The recitals in the Deed of any matters or facts
shall be conclusive proof of the truthfulness thereof. Any person, including Beneficiary, may bid at the sale. Trustee shall apply
the proceeds of the sale to payment of (1) the costs and expenses of exercising the power of sale and of the sale, including the
payment of the Trustee's and attorney's fees. (2) cost of any evidence of title procured in connection with such sale and revenue
stamps on Trustee s Deed. (3) all sums expended under the terms hereof, not then repaid, with accrued interest at the rate provided for in the promissory note for which this Trust Deed is given as security from date of expenditure. (4) all other sums then
secured hereby; and (5) the remainder, if any. to the person or persons legally entitled thereto, or the Trustee, in its discretion,
may deposit the balance of such proceeds with the County Clerk of the county in which the sale took place.
21. Trustor agrees to surrender possession of the hereinabove described Trust property to the Purchaser at the aforesaid
sale, immediately after such sale, in the event such possession has not previously been surrendered by Trustor.
22. Upon the occurrence of any default hereunder. Beneficiary shall have the option to declare all sums secured hereby
immediately due and payable and foreclose this Trust Deed in the manner provided by law for the foreclosure of mortgages
on real property and Beneficiary shall be entitled to recover in such proceedings all costs and expenses incident thereto,
including a reasonable attorney's fee in such amount as shall be fixed by the court.
23. Beneficiary may appoint a successor trustee at any time by filing for record in the office of the County Recorder of
each county in which said property or some part thereof is situated, a substitution of trustee. From the time the substitution
is filed for record, the new trustee shall succeed to all the powers, duties, authority and title of the trustee named herein or of
any successor trustee Each such substitution shall be executed and acknowledged, and notice thereof shall be given and proof
thereof made, in the manner provided by law.
24. This Trust Deed shall apply to. inure to the benefit of. and bind all parties hereto, their heirs, legatees, devisees,
administrators, executors, successors, and assigns. All obligations of Trustor h^rmuno'er are joint and several. The term
"Beneficiary" shall mean the owner and holder, including any pledgee, of the note secured hereby. In this Trust Deed, whenever
the context so requires, the masculine gender includes the feminine and/or neuter, and the singular number includes the plural.
25. Trustee accepts this Trust when this Trust Deed, duly executed and acknowledged, is made a public record as provided by law. Trustee is not obligated to notify any party hereto of pending sale under any other Trust Deed or of any action
or proceeding in which Trustor, Beneficiary, or Trustee shall be a party, unless brought by Trustee.
2& This Trust Deed shall be construed according to the laws of the State of Utah.
27. The undersigned Trustor requests that a copy of any notice of default and of any notice of sale hereunder be mailed
to Trustor at the address hereinbefore set forth.
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REQUEST FOR FULL R E C O N V E Y A N C E
(To be used only when indebtedness secured hereby has been paid in full)
TO TRUSTEE.
The undersigned is the legal owner and holder of the note and all other indebtedness secured by the within Trust Deed.
Said note together with all other indebtedness secured by said Trust Deed has been fully paid and satisfied; and you are hereby
requested and directed, on payment to you of any sums owing to you under the terms of said Trust Deed, to cancel said
note above mentioned, and all other evidences of indebtedness secured by said Trust Deed delivered to you herewith, together
with the said Trust Deed, and to reconvey, without warranty, to the parties designated by the terms of said Trust Deed, all the
•state now held by you thereunder.
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